



Serie di webinar Sezione ANIMP-DIM (Digital & Innovation Management)
IA per l'Impiantistica

27/11/2024 | h. 16:00

**Protezione della supply chain
e minacce GenAI
Lezioni dal caso CrowdStrike
e strategie per la cybersecurity del futuro**



SUPPLY CHAIN & AI CYBERSECURITY

27 novembre 2024

a cura di:


Francesco Cristofori

Head of Data Protection & Cyber Security
ERREVI SYSTEM



ANIMP Sezione DIM (Digital & Innovation Management)
Serie di webinar: IA per l'Impiantistica







SUPPLY CHAIN & AI CYBERSECURITY

AGENDA

- Supply Chain Security: rischi e contromisure
 - Il Caso CrowdStrike
- AI & Cybersecurity: chiarezza e prospettive






SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

ASPETTI NORMATIVI


NIS2 (D.Lgs. 138, 4/9/2024)

- *Art. 24* - Obblighi in materia di misure di gestione dei rischi per la sicurezza informatica
 - Approccio **multi-rischio** (comma 2)
 - Attenzione ai **rapporti contrattuali** con i fornitori di beni/servizi (comma 2.d)
 - Attenzione all'**acquisizione, sviluppo e manutenzione** dei sistemi informativi e di rete (comma 2.e)
 - Valutazione delle vulnerabilità, della qualità e delle **pratiche di sicurezza del fornitore** (comma 3)
- *Art. 23* – Organi di Amministrazione e direttivi
 - Sono ritenuti **esplicitamente responsabili** delle violazioni (comma 1.c)
- *Art. 31* – Proporzionalità e gradualità degli obblighi
 - Grado di **esposizione** ai rischi
 - **Dimensione** dell'azienda
 - **Probabilità e impatto** degli incidenti

ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (ISO/IEC 27002)



- A.5.19 - Sicurezza delle informazioni nelle relazioni con i fornitori
- A.5.20 - Sicurezza delle informazioni negli accordi con i fornitori
- A.5.21 - Gestione della sicurezza delle informazioni nella filiera di fornitura per l'ICT
- A.5.22 - Monitoraggio riesame e gestione dei cambiamenti dei servizi dei fornitori
- A.8.26 - Requisiti di sicurezza delle applicazioni
- A.8.27 - Sicurezza dell'architettura dei sistemi e dei principi di ingegnerizzazione
- A.8.30 - Sviluppo affidato all'esterno



SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY


RISCHI & CONTROMISURE


RISCHI

- Eventi avversi su un partner possono pregiudicare la continuità operativa
- Relazioni consolidate portano a eccessi di fiducia
- Disomogeneità dei perimetri di responsabilità possono lasciare lacune di protezione dei dati
- Cessazione attività partner

CONTROMISURE


- Zero Trust: ogni partner deve poter operare sui propri sistemi/applicazioni, dopo essersi autenticato
- Staging area: le modifiche non vanno realizzate nell'ambiente di produzione, ma in aree di test/staging
- Definire contrattualmente i perimetri di protezione dei dati
- Richiedere e mantenere documentazione sistemi/applicazioni





SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

IL CASO CROWDSTRIKE



The outage disrupted daily life, businesses, and governments around the world. Many industries were affected—airlines, airports, banks, hotels, hospitals, [manufacturing](#), [stock markets](#), [broadcasting](#), gas stations, retail stores, and more—as were [governmental services](#), such as [emergency services](#) and [websites](#).^{[4][5]} The financial damage has been estimated to be at least [US\\$10 billion](#).^[6]

Cause [\[edit\]](#)

The 19 July update was an instance of a template that was tested and released in the Falcon Sensor software. This new instance, Channel File 291, passed validation due to a flaw in the software.^{[277][14]} The Falcon Sensor itself parses the file differently in a way that led to the outage.

Centralisation and homogeneity [\[edit\]](#)

The outage raised questions about [oligopoly](#) and centralisation in the information technology sector.

IT practices [\[edit\]](#)

Experts speculate that the update was not put through routine [patch management](#) procedures.

Delta, CrowdStrike sue each other over widespread IT outage that caused thousands of cancellations

PUBLISHED FRI, OCT 25 2024 7:34 PM EDT | UPDATED MON, OCT 28 2024 3:23 PM EDT



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KEY POINTS

- Delta is asking for damages to cover over \$500 million in losses, along with litigation costs and punitive damages, after an IT outage involving CrowdStrike's security software.
- The airline, which canceled thousands of flights and struggled to recover compared with competitors, said CrowdStrike's software flaws reached its computers even though it had disabled automatic updates.
- CrowdStrike, in its own suit, said "Delta's own negligence" led to its issues.




Prefer to Listen?

NOW

UP NEXT

TRENDING





AI CYBERSECURITY

IMPORTANCE OF AI IN CYBER SEC

In 2024 the market size for AI in cybersecurity will reach

\$24.8 billion

By 2032 is projected to reach an impressive

\$102 billion

48.9%

of global executives and security experts consider AI and ML as potent tools to combat modern cyber threats.

44%

of global organizations are already leveraging AI to detect security intrusions.



QUALI STRUMENTI HANNO AI?


- EDR/XDR
- NDR/IDS/IPS
- Data Classification Platform
- Threat Intelligence Platform
- SIEM/SOAR/Log Analysis
- User Behavioral Analysis

QUALI BENEFICI CON L'AI?

- Velocità di risposta
- Linguaggio naturale
- Adattamento al contesto
- Dataset virtualmente illimitati
- Scalabilità

QUALI MINACCE CON L'AI?



- Social Engineering evoluto (DeepFake)
- Ricerca e sfruttamento di vulnerabilità più veloce
- Profilazione dei bersagli più efficiente
- Disinformazione su larga scala (attacchi reputazionali)
- Strumenti a disposizione di tutti
- Nuove tipologie di attacco verso le AI



AI CYBERSECURITY

OWASP TOP 10 for LLM/GenAI

LLM01 Prompt Injection LLM01: Prompt Injection Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when an attacker manipulates a large...	LLM02 Insecure Output Handling LLM02: Insecure Output Handling Insecure Output Handling refers specifically to insufficient validation, sanitization, and...	LLM03 Training Data Poisoning LLM03: Training Data Poisoning The starting point of any machine learning approach is training...	LLM04 Model Denial of Service LLM04: Model Denial of Service An attacker interacts with an LLM in a method that...	LLM05 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities The supply chain in LLMs can be vulnerable, impacting the...
LLM06 Sensitive Information Disclosure LLM06: Sensitive Information Disclosure LLM applications have the potential to reveal sensitive information, proprietary...	LLM07 Insecure Plugin Design LLM07: Insecure Plugin Design LLM plugins are extensions that, when enabled, are called automatically...	LLM08 Excessive Agency LLM08: Excessive Agency An LLM-based system is often granted a degree of agency...	LLM09 Overreliance LLM09: Overreliance Overreliance can occur when an LLM produces erroneous information and...	LLM10 Model Theft LLM10: Model Theft This entry refers to the unauthorized access and exfiltration of...




AI CYBERSECURITY

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AI CYBERSECURITY


ESEMPIO: DIFENDERSI DA PROMPT INJECTION



- L'input dell'utente può contenere "codice da eseguire", sfruttabile per aggirare le precauzioni degli LLM;
- L'accesso diretto agli LLM va evitato, mediandolo con strumenti che mitigano gli input malevoli.

AI CYBERSECURITY

LLM01 Prompt Injection LLM01: Prompt Injection Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when an attacker manipulates a large...	LLM02 Insecure Output Handling LLM02: Insecure Output Handling Insecure Output Handling refers specifically to insufficient validation, sanitization, and...	LLM03 Training Data Poisoning LLM03: Training Data Poisoning The starting point of any machine learning approach is training...	LLM04 Model Denial of Service LLM04: Model Denial of Service An attacker interacts with an LLM in a method that...	LLM05 Supply Chain Vulnerabilities LLM05: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities The supply chain in LLMs can be vulnerable, impacting the...
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AI CYBERSECURITY

ESEMPIO: “AVVELENARE” UN LLM

A real-world example of this is attacks against the spam filters used by email providers. In [a 2018 blog post](#) on machine learning attacks, Elie Bursztein, who leads the anti-abuse research team at Google said: “In practice, we regularly see some of the most advanced spammer groups trying to throw the Gmail filter off- track by reporting massive amounts of spam emails as not spam [...] Between the end of Nov 2017 and early 2018, there were at least four malicious large-scale attempts to skew our classifier.”






LLM SUPPLY CHAIN POISONING IN 4 STEPS

- 1 The adversary surgically modifies LLMs to spread misinformation
- 2 The adversary uploads the poisoned model in a public repo (e.g. Hugging face)




- 3 An LLM builder integrates the poisoned model unknowing of backdoors
- 4 End users consume poisoned models spreading fake news



- Il training set dei modelli va validato ex-ante;
- L'acquisizione di modelli da fonti esterne richiede attenzione e verifiche prima di affidare decisioni critiche basate sul suo output.


AI CYBERSECURITY

COME DIFENDERSI?



- Scenari di minaccia eterogenei;
- Componenti non tradizionali da proteggere (es. Vector databases, prompt, training sets, ...);
- Pochi prodotti e servizi di protezione.

AI CYBERSECURITY



GANDALF

We've created Gandalf
for the AI community. 🧙

Our game "Gandalf" has been played by millions of people around the globe, making it the most popular AI security game in the world.

It has given us completely new insights into what it means to secure AI systems. Give it a go yourself.

Play Gandalf

<https://gandalf.lakera.ai/>